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Case No. 920454-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTE8 AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the State's evidence sufficiently supported a 
probable cause bindover determination. •• [T]he district court need 
show no deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion, . . . but may 
conduct its own review of the order." State v. Humphrey. 818 P.2d 
1027 (Utah 1991); State v, Cooper. 809 P.2d 515, 517 (Idaho App. 
1991) ("our standard of review of a district court decision where the 
district court is sitting in an appellate capacity is one of free 
review"); accord Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 
(Utah App, 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CA8E AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
attempted unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or 
arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), and pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. 
(R 55-61, 65; 128). 
On May 1, 1992, the State filed an Information which was 
then amended and refiled on June 12, 1992. (R 07-08, 21-22). On 
June 17, 1992, Mr. Miranda-Ramirez moved "to Quash the Bindover of 
the Circuit Court and to Dismiss the Information[. ]lf (R 20; 
79-105). The trial court denied his motions. (R 50-52). 
Mr. Miranda-Ramirez then entered a conditional plea of 
guilty contingent upon his right to appeal the court's ruling. 
(R 55-61; 111; 120-21; 127-28). Following its acceptance of the 
plea, the court sentenced Mr. Miranda-Ramirez to an indeterminate 
term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison and also ordered 
him to make various payments. The court immediately suspended 
imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for three years. 
(R 65). Due to his status as an illegal alien, Mr. Miranda-Ramirez 
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was deported1 by the I.N.S. Other facts relevant to this section 
are stated elsewhere in the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State initially filed an Information, dated May 8, 
1992, which alleged in relevant part that Mr. Miranda Ramirez "did 
knowingly and intentionally distribute, offer, agree, consent or 
arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, to-wit: 
Cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance. (R 07) (emphasis 
added). On June 12, 1992, the State filed an Amended Information 
which alleged that Mr. Miranda Ramirez "did knowingly and 
intentionally offer, agree, consent or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance, to-wit: Cocaine, a Schedule II 
Controlled Substance. (R 21). With the exception of the word, 
"distribute," the Amended Information was essentially the same as 
the initially filed Information. 
The amendment resulted from a preliminary hearing 
discussion, held on May 21, 1992, in which the State was unable to 
produce a toxicologist (report) or establish a chain of custody that 
could identify the evidence obtained as cocaine or a counterfeit 
substance. (R 23-49). The State deleted the "distribute" language 
and instead focused on whether Mr. Miranda-Ramirez had "offered" to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance. (R 81-82). 
1 Cf. United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 
294 n.2 (1971); State v. Ortiz, 774 P.2d 1229 (Wash. 1989) 
(deportation does not moot the appeal). 
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According to the State, Detective Tony Garcia and another 
undercover narcotics officer entered the Shamrock bar on April 23, 
1991. (R 30-31). The charge was based on detective Garcia's belief 
that the substance in a "baggy" was cocaine notwithstanding the 
State's failure of produce the substance, itself. 
[Witness, Detective Garcia]: On that evening Detective 
Lucas and myself walked in the Shamrock bar. We were 
approached by several individuals as to ahw, if we wanted 
to buy some some [sic] narcotics, cocaine. Ahw, we by 
passed those individuals and one sat down at a booth. 
While we were sitting at the booth the defendant came up to 
me and asked me if I needed anything. 
[Prosecutor]: By the defendant you're talking about the 
[man] that just sat down? 
A: Yes, I am. 
Q: Alright. And when he came up and sat down next to you 
what did he say? 
A: Ahw, I asked him, he asked me if I needed anything I 
told him ahw, ahw, I wanted a l/16th — cocaine. 
Q: How did he respond to that? 
A: Ahw . • • 
Pros: . . . And ahw, how did he respond to that when you 
say you wanted l/16th ounce of cocaine? 
Wit [Garcia]: Ahw, he showed me ahw, small baggy of 
cocaine which he produced and held it in front of me. 
Q: Alright. What did you say? 
A: I asked him how much he wanted for it. 
Q: What did he say? 
A: He said $60 dollars. 
Q: And then what? 
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A: I handed him a $100 dollar bill he handed me the baggy 
of cocaine and $40 dollars change. 
Q: And any further dealings with him that night? 
A: No I did not. 
(R 32-33). 
The State's contention was that it did not have to produce 
the substance, regardless of whether it was real or counterfeit, 
because the prosecution's focus was on the "offer" to distribute the 
substance. 
It is the State's position [now] . . . and at the 
preliminary hearing [on this charge] . . . that when the 
offer is made and something that the defendant holds out to 
be a controlled substance is agreed upon, whether or not a 
real narcotic exists, [then] that crime is complete. We 
did not bring the controlled substance itself to the 
hearing nor the toxicology report. We brought in an 
officer [detective Garcia] who stated he dealt with 
Mr. [Miranda-]Ramirez. He handed over money and 
Mr. [Miranda-]Ramirez handed over something 
Mr. [Miranda-]Ramirez [sic] held out to be cocaine. 
(R 81-82). The differences between the prosecutor's recollection 
and the actual testimony of detective Garcia will be elaborated upon 
below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The testimony of the State's key witness, Detective Garcia, 
did not provide evidence of the existence of a crime. Even though 
Garcia may have subjectively perceived his encounter with 
Mr. Miranda-Ramirez as one involving a drug "buy," since no evidence 
of cocaine was produced and because Miranda-Ramirez never 
represented that he would sell Garcia a controlled substance, 
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Mr. Miranda-Ramirez's conduct did not fall under the plain language 
of the statute. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROBABLE CAUSE BINDOVER DETERMINATION WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), reads "it is 
unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally . . . 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance[.]" Id. (emphasis added). Following the preliminary 
hearing, the word "distribute" was deleted from the Information and 
the State instead emphasized that Mr. Miranda-Ramirez had already 
completed the crime when he "offered" to distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance. (R 51) (Minute entry) ("It is the State's 
position that the essence of the crime charged is the offering to 
sell a controlled or counterfeit substance"); (R 81). 
Since the State failed to provide proof that the involved 
substance was in fact cocaine, the alleged crime must be shown 
through evidence of a "counterfeit substance." Cf. (R 115) ("at the 
preliminary hearing, the State elected, affirmatively elected not to 
bring on the chain, toxicology and the actual drugs because we [the 
State] think that we have met probable cause of a crime [offering to 
distribute]"). However, as reflected by the involved officer's 
testimony, Mr. Ramirez-Miranda never represented that the substance 
in the baggy was cocaine or a counterfeit substance. Ramirez-
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Miranda stated only that he wanted $60 dollars for the contents in 
the baggy. Detective Garcia was the person responsible for 
expressing his interest in cocaine. Mr. Miranda-Ramirez's conduct 
did not amount to a crime under the plain language of the statute: 
Q [the prosecutor]: Alright. And when he [Miranda-
Ramirez] came up and sat down next to you [detective 
Garcia] what did he say? 
A [Garcia]: Ahw, I asked him, he asked me if I needed 
anything I told him ahw, ahw, I wanted a l/16th — cocaine. 
Q: How did he respond to that? 
A: Ahw • . . 
. . . 
Pros: . . . And ahw, how did he respond to that when you 
say you wanted 1/16th ounce of cocaine? 
Wit [Garcia]: Ahw, he showed me ahw, small baggy of 
cocaine which he produced and held it in front of me. 
Q: Alright. What did you say? 
A: I asked him how much he wanted for it. 
Q: What did he say? 
A: He said $60 dollars. 
Q: And then what? 
A: I handed him a $100 dollar bill he handed me the baggy 
of cocaine and $40 dollars change. 
(R 32-33). 
Asking a person if he "needs anything" does not amount to 
agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Nor would the involved statute criminalize a 
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"baggy" sale notwithstanding the detective's perceptions, as opposed 
to an individual's representations of the contents at issue. The 
statute focuses only on the accused's representations and places no 
relevance on the detective's preconceived notions or his perceptions 
of ambiguous conduct. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(5)(b) 
("'Counterfeit substance' means . . . any substance that is 
represented to be a controlled substance"). 
Nothing in the record reflects whether the substance in the 
baggy weighed "l/16th" of an ounce or even if the amount would have 
appeared consistent with the detective's request. Particularly 
since detective Garcia had never previously bought or attempted to 
buy narcotics (or counterfeit substances) from Mr. Miranda-Ramirez, 
(R 42), Garcia lacked the benefit of prior dealings or a course of 
performance as a means of interpretion. The State failed to clarify 
whether Miranda-Ramirez's production of a baggie was not simply a 
follow up to his willingness to sell "anything" to Garcia, as 
opposed to a misplaced perception of a targeted individual suspected 
of drug dealing. The burden of proof and the burden of resolving 
ambiguous conduct fell on the State.2 
2 Unlike other cases where neither the validity of the 
drug nor the representations of the defendant were at issue, see. 
e.g., State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184 (Utah App. 1990) (citing cases), 
here the defendant's conduct or lack or conduct could not be viewed 




Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction. 
SUBMITTED this jLQ day of October, 1992. 
ONALD S. FUJI1 R INO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
HI) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally: 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; _ 
